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THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PUBLIC FORUM
JOHN D. INAZU*
ABSTRACT
The quintessential city park symbolizes a core feature of a demo-
cratic polity: the freedom of all citizens to express their views in
public spaces free from the constraints of government imposed ortho-
doxy. The city park finds an unlikely cousin in the federal tax code’s
recognition of deductions for contributions made to charitable, reli-
gious, and educational organizations. Together, these three categories
of tax-exempt organizations encompass a vast array of groups in civil
society.
The city park is a traditional public forum under First Amend-
ment doctrine, and the charitable, educational, and religious deduc-
tions under the federal tax code function much like a limited public
forum. Numerous other governmental arrangements reflect similar
purposes and functions: sidewalks, parking lots, public schools,
websites, public libraries, vanity license plates, and student activity
funds, to name a few. In each of these cases, private groups and
individuals rely on government resources (financial or otherwise) to
inculcate and express their ideas and their ways of life. The ideal of
the public forum represents one of the most important aspects of a
* Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University. This Article
was prepared for the 2014 Symposium at William & Mary Law School on “The Contemporary
First Amendment: Speech, Press, and Assembly.” Portions of the Article draw from the Brief
Amicus Curiae for the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference et al. in Support
of Petitioners, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (No. 12-1168) (Sept. 16, 2013) (co-
authored by John Inazu and Michael McConnell). Thanks to Joseph Blocher, Neil Richards,
Greg Magarian, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Susan Appleton, Russell Osgood, Kent Hayden,
Catherine Crane, Kevin Walsh, Marc DeGirolami, and Mike Martinich-Sauter for comments
on earlier versions of the Article, and to Paige Burnham, Rebecca Morton, Claire Melvin, and
David Dean for excellent research assistance. Thanks also to Jill Askren and the editors of
the William & Mary Law Review for their thorough and detailed editorial assistance.
1159
1160 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1159
healthy democracy. It signifies a willingness to tolerate dissent, dis-
comfort, and even instability. The distortion of that ideal represents
one of the greatest challenges to First Amendment jurisprudence
today. That distortion is partially attributable to two important
doctrinal developments. The first is increased judicial reliance on
purportedly “content-neutral” time, place, and manner restrictions.
The second is the relationship between the public forum and the
evolving government speech doctrine, under which the government
characterizes messages advanced under the auspices of its financial
and other resources as distinctively its own and not subject to First
Amendment review. This Article suggests that one factor facilitating
these developments is a gradual but unmistakable shift in the
moorings of the public forum doctrine from the Assembly Clause to
the Speech Clause. The public forum is a First Amendment doctrine,
not a free speech doctrine, and we will comprehend its purposes and
its possibilities only when we rediscover the values underlying the
rights of the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The quintessential city park boasts fields, benches, sidewalks,
and playgrounds. It also reflects our “profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”1 The city government owns and
manages the land and the physical structures built upon it. But
within this space, anyone can say almost anything.2 Skaters, vaga-
bonds, hipsters, Klansmen, lesbians, Christians, and cowboys—the
city park accommodates them all. The city park thus symbolizes a
core feature of a democratic polity: the freedom of all citizens to
express their views in public spaces free from the constraints of
government-imposed orthodoxy.
The city park finds an unlikely cousin in the federal tax code’s
recognition of deductions for contributions made to charitable, reli-
gious, and educational organizations.3 The deductions effectively
allow individual taxpayers to direct federal dollars to nonprofits of
their choosing.4 The meanings of “charitable” and “educational” are
1. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (referring to streets and parks as “quintessential
public forums”).
2. Speech that advocates imminent lawless action is prohibited. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state may not proscribe advocacy of the use of
force “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action”). Certain “unprotected” categories of speech can also be restricted. See, e.g., Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that obscenity does not receive First
Amendment protection because it is “utterly without redeeming social importance”). But the
limits on discourse in the public forum are otherwise minimal.
3. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012) (authorizing deductions); Id. § 501(c)(3) (specifying which
tax-exempt organizations are eligible to receive deductions). The § 501(c)(3) designation
conveys tax-exempt status, but it is the § 170(c) deduction that provides tangible financial
benefits to tax-exempt organizations because “nonprofit organizations, as their name sug-
gests, do not ordinarily generate the profits that are the base of the corporate income tax.”
RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 443 (2d ed. 2007). 
4. Each qualifying deduction claimed by taxpayers provides an indirect government
subsidy to the organization receiving the donation. A taxpayer who itemizes her deductions
sees her tax liability reduced at the amount equal to her donation multiplied by her income
tax rate. That forgone tax revenue can be viewed as an indirect government subsidy of the
organization, and the amount and direction of the subsidy is largely a function of the
individual taxpayer. As an example, suppose that Sally donates $100 to the Girl Scouts and
itemizes her deduction on her federal income taxes. Suppose further that her income is taxed
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deliberately broad, and the code does not define “religious” organiza-
tions.5 Together, these three categories of tax-exempt organizations
encompass a vast array of groups in civil society—so vast that every
one of us could find groups we think belong and also groups we find
morally repugnant and harmful to society. And, of course, our lists
of reprehensible groups would differ—the pro-choice group and the
pro-life group, religious groups of all stripes (or no stripe), hunting
organizations and animal rights groups—the tax deductions benefits
them all. The resulting mosaic enacts the aspirations of a democrat-
ic polity. Organizations and ideas wither or thrive not by govern-
ment fiat, but rather based on the “values and the choices of private
givers.”6
by the federal government at a 30 percent rate. Under § 170(c), and because the Girl Scouts
are a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, Sally pays $30 less in income tax based on her $100
donation. In effect, that means the government paid (or subsidized) $30 of Sally’s $100 dona-
tion. Sally is out-of-pocket only $70 for the $100 that the Girl Scouts received.
5. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (listing “[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or founda-
tion, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes” as “exempt organizations”). According to IRS regula-
tions, the term “charitable” is used “in its generally accepted legal sense” and is not limited
by the other tax-exempt purposes listed in § 501(c)(3). 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2014).
The regulation states that the term “charitable” includes:
“[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public
buildings, monuments or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and
promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the
above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice
and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv)
to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.”
Id. An educational organization under the code is one that relates to: “(a) The instruction or
training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities; or (b)
The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the
community.” Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). Over 1.1 million organizations qualify as exempt under
§ 501(c)(3). Scope of the Nonprofit Sector, INDEP. SECTOR, http://www.independentsector.org/
scope_of_the_sector [http://perma.cc/V87B-Y7FA] (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). That figure
excludes 327,000 religious congregations. Id. Section 508(c) creates the legal presumption that
religious congregations qualify for tax-exemption without having to apply for recognition of
§ 501(c)(3) status. I.R.C. § 508(c). Section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) exempts churches from having to
file a Form 990. Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i).
6. JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 155 (1995).
Colombo and Hall argue that allowing each individual “to pursue his own notion of the good”
is an “elemental freedom [that] constitutes a basic constraint on the political sphere.” Id. at
154. The charitable exemption is “born out of the spirit of classic liberalism, whose dominant
tenets ... were distrust of government and faith that the progress and well-being of mankind
could best be achieved by natural forces, harmonizing the individual actions of men who were
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The city park is a traditional public forum under First Amend-
ment doctrine, and the charitable, educational, and religious deduc-
tions under the federal tax code function much like a limited public
forum.7 Numerous other governmental arrangements reflect similar
purposes and functions, such as sidewalks, parking lots, public
schools, websites, public libraries, vanity license plates, and student
activity funds.8 In each of these cases, private groups and individu-
als rely on government resources (financial or otherwise) to incul-
cate and express their ideas and their ways of life.9 In some cases,
left untrammeled.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Streets and parks are “quintessential public forums.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). In limited public forums, by contrast, “the State is
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech,” and “[t]he State
may be justified in ‘reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics.’” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Nevertheless, speech restric-
tions in limited public forums “must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint
[and] the restriction must be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’” Id. at
106-07 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court also acknowledged that “the same principles
are applicable” to a limited public forum that is “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830 (1995). The scheme of tax deductions is not formally recognized as a limited public forum,
but like the metaphysical forum at issue in Rosenberger, its current function reflects similar
goals and uses. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 6, at 154-55; Johnny Rex Buckles,
Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 397-99 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98 (discussing schools); United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983) (discussing sidewalks); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (discus-
sing books comprising a public school library); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956
(9th Cir. 2008) (discussing vanity license plates); Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.
2007) (discussing student activity funds); Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834
(6th Cir. 2000) (discussing a government website); Bolbol v. City of Daly City, 754 F. Supp.
2d 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing parking lots). But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
(holding that a state-run scholarship program is not a public forum); United States v. Kokin-
da, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding that a postal sidewalk is not a traditional public forum);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (holding that a feder-
al workplace charitable fundraising campaign is a nonpublic forum). For a helpful overview
of some of these governmental arrangements, see Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 367, 367-71 (2010).
9. Importantly, both monetary and nonmonetary contributions can be construed as gov-
ernment subsidies. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991) (referring to “the
existence of a Government ‘subsidy,’ in the form of Government-owned property”); Tex.
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (“Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy
that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become ‘indirect and vicarious donors.’”
(quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983))); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (“A tax exemption has much the same ef-
fect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its
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the government offers these arrangements with the express purpose
of facilitating a diversity of private viewpoints. But government’s
purpose should not be the only relevant inquiry. Sometimes, the
historical or ongoing uses of a government-provided arrangement
make it the functional equivalent of a public forum.10 For example,
whatever its original purpose, the current federal tax code supports
a diverse range of private groups free from government-imposed
orthodoxy.11
The ideal of the public forum represents one of the most im-
portant aspects of a healthy democracy. It signifies a willingness to
tolerate dissent, discomfort, and even instability. The distortion of
that ideal represents one of the greatest challenges to First Amend-
ment jurisprudence today. Under current law, political protestors
are relegated to physically distant and ironically named “free speech
zones.”12 Anti-abortion demonstrators are prohibited from public
income.”).
10. The Supreme Court’s current doctrinal approach is drawn more narrowly than my
functionalist argument. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
680 (1992) (“The decision to create a public forum must ... be made ‘by intentionally opening
a nontraditional forum for public discourse.’” (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802)); cf. id. at
693 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“ ‘[I]f our public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we
must recognize that certain objective characteristics of Government property and its custom-
ary use by the public may control’ the status of the property.” (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at
737 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
11. The nature of the tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) is traceable to the traditional law
of charitable trusts. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
28-38 (1995). It stands in contrast to a “managerial domain” of government. See Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) [hereinafter Post, Subsidized Speech]
(“Within managerial domains, the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends.
The constitutional value of managerial domains is that of instrumental rationality, a value
that conceptualizes persons as means to an end rather than as autonomous agents. Within
managerial domains, therefore, ends may be imposed upon persons. Managerial domains are
necessary so that a democratic state can actually achieve objectives that have been demo-
cratically agreed upon. Yet managerial domains are organized along lines that contradict the
premises of democratic self-governance. For this reason, First Amendment doctrine within
managerial domains differs fundamentally from First Amendment doctrine within public
discourse.”); see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1784 (1986) [hereinafter Post, Between
Governance] (“[P]ublic and nonpublic forums should be distinguished according to whether
government authority over a resource is ‘like’ that characteristic of the internal management
of a state institution, or instead ‘like’ that characteristic of the governance of the general
public.”).
12. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES
IN PUBLIC PLACES 223-38, 277-81 (2009). 
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sidewalks outside of abortion clinics.13 Labor picketers confront on-
erous restrictions against their practices in public areas.14 Churches
are prohibited from renting generally available public facilities.15
Groups with certain membership requirements are banned from
public school campuses.16 And groups that are deemed contrary to
“public policy” are denied tax-exempt status.17 The public forum in
practice is quite unrecognizable from its theory, and that departure
should give us great pause.
The problems with today’s public forum are partially attributable
to two important doctrinal developments. The first is increased ju-
dicial reliance on purportedly “content-neutral” time, place, and
manner restrictions.18 The second is the relationship between the
public forum and the evolving government speech doctrine, under
which the government characterizes messages advanced under the
auspices of its financial and other resources as distinctively its own
and not subject to First Amendment review.19 This Article suggests
13. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000). But see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct.
2518, 2541 (2014) (striking down a Massachusetts restriction on anti-abortion sidewalk coun-
selors and questioning but not overruling Hill).
14. See Marion Crain & John D. Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015) (discussing restrictions on labor protests).
15. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 650 F.3d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2011)
(upholding a public school board policy prohibiting use of school property for “religious wor-
ship services”). 
16. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978-79 (2010); see also Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed,
648 F.3d 790, 795-96 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that a public university might deny official
recognition to Christian student groups that limit “their members and officers [to those who]
profess a specific religious belief, namely, Christianity”); Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d
634, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a high school Bible club violated a school district’s
nondiscrimination policies because of the club’s requirement that its members “possess a ‘true
desire to ... grow in a relationship with Jesus Christ’ inherently excludes non-Christians”)
(alteration in original).
17. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983).
18. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
19. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (holding that the
government speech doctrine barred a First Amendment challenge to the city’s decisions
pertaining to monuments in a public park). A related question arises when the government
simply declares a particular place or funding mechanism not to be a public forum. See, e.g.,
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004) (dismissing the respondent’s free speech argu-
ment in a footnote, declaring that the state scholarship program was “not a forum for
speech”). And there is, of course, a line to be drawn between the lack of a public forum and a
nonpublic forum. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that respondents
had “no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets” at
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that one factor facilitating these developments is a gradual but un-
mistakable shift in the moorings of the public forum doctrine from
the Assembly Clause to the Speech Clause. The public forum is a
First Amendment doctrine, not a free speech doctrine. And we will
only comprehend its purposes and its possibilities when we re-
discover the values underlying the rights of the First Amendment.20
Part I describes the roots of the right of assembly, the evolution
of the public forum out of that right, and the gradual shift of the
public forum to the speech right. Part II highlights two problems
that emerge from a speech-centered focus of the doctrine. Part III
considers ways to reclaim a more robust concept of the public forum
through renewed focus on the right of assembly and the values that
underlie it.21
I. THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND THE ROOTS OF THE PUBLIC FORUM
A. The Right of Assembly
One of the goals of this Article is to reestablish the historical and
doctrinal connections between the public forum and the right of
assembly. These connections are traceable to the Framers’ recogni-
tion that the rights of speech and assembly are distinct and serve
different purposes and values.22 During the House debates over the
language of the Bill of Rights, Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts
criticized the proposed right of assembly as redundant in light of the
freedom of speech: “If people freely converse together, they must
a military base).
20. See generally John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty,
92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 787-88 (2014) (describing the importance of recognizing the distinct rights
under the First Amendment).
21. My prior work has insufficiently accounted for the connections between the right of
assembly and the decline of the public forum doctrine. See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE:
THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012) (noting but not exploring the relationship). I
am grateful to Michael McConnell and Timothy Zick for pushing me on this connection. See
Timothy Zick, Recovering the Assembly Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 375, 396-97 (2012); Michael
McConnell, Freedom by Association, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2012, at 39, 43. This important
link between assembly and the public forum takes on even greater significance when combin-
ed with the broader shift away from assembly to the rights of speech and expressive
association. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971). 
22. See INAZU, supra note 21. The discussion that follows draws from id. at 21-25. 
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assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable right
which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be
called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to de-
scend to such minutiae.”23 John Page of Virginia responded with a
reference to William Penn’s trial for unlawful assembly.24 Historian
Irving Brant notes that “[t]he mere reference to it was equivalent to
half an hour of oratory.”25 After Page spoke, the House defeated
Sedgwick’s motion to strike assembly from the draft amendment by
a “considerable majority.”26
At another point in the debates over the text of the assembly
clause, the drafters removed a reference that would have limited
assembly to those purposes that served “the common good.”27 We do
not know the reason for the textual change, but we know its conse-
quences: if the right of assembly had encompassed only the common
good (as defined by the state), then assembly as a means of protest
or dissent would have been greatly curtailed.28 Congress decided
otherwise. On September 24, 1789, the Senate approved the amend-
ment in its final form, without reference to the common good, and
the subsequent ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 enacted “the
right of the people peaceably to assemble.”29 The final wording, with
the qualification that assembly must be “peaceable,” suggests an
23. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
24. Id. On August 14, 1670, Penn delivered a sermon to Quakers gathered on Gracechurch
Street in London. IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 56 (1965). He
and a fellow Quaker, William Mead, were promptly arrested. Id. After one of the most cele-
brated trials in history, a jury acquitted the two men on the charge that their public worship
constituted an unlawful assembly. Id. at 59. 
25. BRANT, supra note 24, at 55. 
26. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761. 
27. See INAZU, supra note 21, at 22-23 (describing textual changes in various drafts). 
28. The point was not lost during the House debates. When Thomas Hartley of
Pennsylvania contended that with respect to assembly, “every thing that was not incompatible
with the general good, ought to be granted,” Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts replied that if
Hartley “supposed that the people had a right to consult for the common good” but “could not
consult unless they met for the purpose,” he was in fact “contend[ing] for nothing.” 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 732-33; cf. Melvin Rishe, Comment, Freedom of Assembly, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 317,
337 (1965) (“Were the courts truly bound to delve into whether or not an assembly served the
common good, it is likely that many assemblies that have been held to be protected by the
constitution would lose this protection.”).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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important distinction between the constraints of peaceability and
the constraints of the common good.30
The right of assembly thus emerged as distinct from the free
speech right.31 It reflected different goals and purposes than those
underlying the speech right. One of the most important differences
is that the assembly right necessarily invokes a relational context:
one can speak alone; one cannot assemble alone. A second unique
role of assembly is that it allows multiple actors to engage not only
with an external audience but also with one another within a group
to foster ideas and identities in the “pre-political” and “pre-expres-
sive” moments of group formation.32 These aspects of assembly have
manifested in some of the most significant social movements in our
history and, as importantly, in the informal networks and gather-
ings that preceded them.33
30. See id. Stated differently, the peaceability limitation might reflect a very thin notion
of a common good, but one that excludes only assemblies that engage in violent activity.
31. The right of assembly is also distinct from the right of petition. See generally INAZU,
supra note 21, at 21-25 (tracing textual history). We know this in part from Congressman
Page’s reference during the House debates: “Penn’s gathering had nothing to do with petition;
it was an act of religious worship.” Id. at 25. The Supreme Court has on one occasion
suggested otherwise. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (indicating that the First
Amendment protected the right of assembly only if “the purpose of the assembly was to
petition the government for a redress of grievances”). That erroneous interpretation has been
followed in decades of scholarship, but it has never been reinforced by the Court. See
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010) (referring to “the general ‘right of the
people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes’” (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 551 (1875))); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (referring to “the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances”) (emphasis added);
cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 409 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
First Amendment “has not generally been thought to protect the right peaceably to assemble
only when the purpose of the assembly is to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances”).
32. See INAZU, supra note 21, at 20-62.
33. See, e.g., Brief of Gays & Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting
of Petitioner at 11, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371) (describing “gay social and activity
clubs, retreats, vacations, and professional organizations” that fostered “exclusively gay en-
vironments in which to feel safe, to build relationships, and to develop political strategy”); see
also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS 376-77 (7th ed. 1994) (describing “moments of informality” spread across
clubs, literary parties, and other events that created “a cohesive force” among the leaders of
the Harlem Renaissance); LINDA LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE RIGHT
OF ASSEMBLY 17-19 (1997) (describing suffragist gatherings organized around banner meet-
ings, balls, swimming races, potato sack races, baby shows, meals, pageants, and teatimes).
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The right of assembly also helps to anchor expressive meaning in
nonverbal as well as verbal communication (including the message
that is conveyed by the very existence of a group). It reinforces the
significance of collective expression and the value of nonexpression.
And it highlights, perhaps to an even greater degree than the free
speech right, “the importance of protecting dissent and social
conflict.”34
Finally, although assembly fosters solidarity, it also provides
individual benefits. As Timothy Zick has observed, “The ability to
freely assemble or join with others fortifies individuals” and “em-
boldens them to come forward, and to participate in social and polit-
ical activities.”35 Thus, as Zick notes, “In addition to creating space
for group activities and group autonomy, the freedom of assembly
facilitates a variety of individual acts of defiance, contention, and
expression.”36 These sociological insights are reinforced from exam-
ples ranging from “coming out” experiences37 to religious rebirths.38
B. The Public Forum (and Its Demise)
The concept of the public forum emerged at the height of cultural
and legal attention to the right of assembly. As the United States
entered World War II and celebrated the sesquicentennial anniver-
sary of the Bill of Rights, assembly was featured in patriotic tributes
across the nation.39 It headlined the 1939 World’s Fair and anchored
speeches and opinion pieces across the country.40 At a time when
civil liberties were at the forefront of public consciousness, assembly
34. Zick, supra note 21, at 385. 
35. Id. at 394. 
36. Id. Zick emphasizes that “[m]any of these functions are nonexpressive.” Id. at 395; cf.
id. at 398 (“The First Amendment does not protect assembly solely for the purpose of
communicating some identifiable, coherent message. Assembly is protected in its own right;
it stands on its own bottom.”).
37. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 3-47 (2013) (describing importance of groups to early
gay rights movement); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1171-72 (2000)
(describing “emotional shelter” available to gays and lesbians who form virtual assemblies
through online connections).
38. See, e.g., JASON C. BIVINS, THE FRACTURE OF GOOD ORDER: CHRISTIAN ANTILIBERALISM
AND THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN POLITICS (2003).
39. Inazu, supra note 20, at 805-06.
40. Id.
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figured prominently as one of the original “Four Freedoms” (along
with speech, press, and religion).41
A 1938 comment in the Yale Law Journal offered one of the first
explicit links between assembly and the public forum: “Without the
right of assembly, guaranties of free speech are empty gestures; for
if no public forum is available, the right to speak freely is of little
value.”42 The comment continued:
The greatest obstacle facing minority groups in holding indoor
meetings in the United States is the difficulty of securing a
meeting-hall. Municipal authorities employ numerous tech-
niques to thwart indoor meetings of this sort. Most direct and
blunt is Mayor Hague’s ordinance which, in effect, forbids the
owner of a meeting hall to rent it for Communist meetings
unless police permission is first secured.43
The reference to Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague’s treatment of the
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) was at the time well-
known. Hague’s repeated denials of a permit for the CIO to hold a
public meeting had gained such notoriety that when a CIO delega-
tion met with members of Congress, Representative Knute Hill
“inquired whether Mayor Hague would prevent a group of Congress-
men from hiring a hall in Jersey City to speak on the Bill of
Rights.”44
In 1938, the CIO sued in federal district court to enjoin Hague
from interfering with their First Amendment rights of speech and
assembly.45 The district court granted the injunction solely on free
speech grounds.46 The opinion relied on “the history and philosophy
of free speech” because of “the comparative paucity of material on
free assembly.”47 From that premise, the court concluded that
41. Id. at 804-07 (describing the legal and cultural significance of the “Four Freedoms”). 
42. Comment, Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United States:
A Comparative Study, 47 YALE L.J. 404, 404 (1938).
43. Id. at 421.
44. Congressmen Aid C.I.O. in Hague Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1937, at 1.
45. Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 128 (D.N.J. 1938).
46. Id. at 137.
47. Id. 
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“[i]nasmuch as free assembly is a special form of free speech, the
philosophy of the latter applies.”48
The exclusively speech-based rationale did not last. On appeal to
the Third Circuit, the American Bar Association’s Committee on the
Bill of Rights submitted an amicus brief principally authored by
Zechariah Chafee.49 The lengthy brief placed the right of assembly
at the core of its argument.50 It emphasized that “the integrity of the
right ‘peaceably to assemble’ is an essential element of the Ameri-
can democratic system” and that public officials had the “duty to
make the right of free assembly prevail over the forces of disorder
if by any reasonable effort or means they can possibly do so.”51
Chafee’s brief had immediate influence. The Third Circuit’s
opinion affirmed the district court, but relied more squarely on the
union of “speech and assembly” without suggesting a subordinate or
derivative role of the latter.52 When Mayor Hague appealed to the
Supreme Court, Chafee resubmitted his brief.
The Supreme Court’s 1939 Hague decision drew heavily from
Chafee’s brief.53 Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion interspersed
references to “speech and assembly” with more focused commentary
on the right of assembly.54 And penning one of the more memorable
phrases in First Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Roberts wrote:
“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
48. Id. at 138.
49. Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, as
Friends of the Court, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651) [herein-
after ABA Amicus Brief].
50. The brief ’s first argument was captioned: “Freedom of assembly is an essential
element of the American democratic system.” Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 4, 19. When Chafee published Free Speech in the United States two years later,
his thirty-page discussion of the freedom of assembly largely reprised the brief. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 409-38 (1941). The American Bar
Association later wrote: “Hardly any action in the name of the [Association] in many years,
if ever, has attracted as wide and immediate attention and as general acclaim, as the
preparation and filing of this brief.” Association’s Committee Intervenes to Defend Right of
Public Assembly, 25 A.B.A. J. 7, 7 (1939).
52. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939). 
53. Compare Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1939), with ABA
Amicus Brief, supra note 49, at 37-40. 
54. Hague, 307 U.S. at 514-16. 
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thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”55 The
New York Times lauded the decision, with the headline, “With [the]
Right of Assembly Reasserted, All ‘Four Freedoms’ of [the] Constitu-
tion Are Well Established.”56
Neither assembly nor the public forum saw much doctrinal clarity
in the wake of Hague.57 The shift away from Hague’s assembly focus
began the following term, with the Court’s decision in Thornhill v.
Alabama.58 The case involved a challenge to an anti-picketing ordin-
ance by labor protesters.59 The protesters had argued that the
statute as interpreted by the lower courts “den[ied] workers the
right to peaceably assemble and peaceably discuss their working
conditions with their fellow workers in the vicinity of their em-
ployer’s plant.”60 Oddly, the Court’s opinion appeared to latch on to
the brief ’s reference to a “right of discussion” but made no mention
of the assembly right asserted in the same sentence.61
Thornhill and subsequent cases limited the influence of an
assembly-based public forum doctrine. But a generation later, Harry
Kalven reaffirmed the assembly roots of Hague by highlighting the
influence of Chafee’s brief:
55. Id. at 515.
56. Dean Dinwoodey, A Fundamental Liberty Upheld in Hague Case, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 1939, at E7; see Lewis Wood, Hague Ban on C.I.O. Voided by the Supreme Court, 5-2, on
Free Assemblage Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1939, at 1. Within months of Hague, the Court
underscored that “the streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of
information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). The Court recognized the right of assembly
as “fundamental” and insisted that it “cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions.” De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). “[I]t is, and always has been, one of the attributes
of citizenship under a free government.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1876). 
57. See INAZU, supra note 21 (tracing decline of assembly).
58. 310 U.S. 88, 89 (1940).
59. Id. at 90-91.
60. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88 (No. 514), 1939 WL 48828, at *27. 
61. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97 (“It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor
but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom
of discussion.”); id. at 101-02 (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”). Although
a “right of discussion” is not unknown to American political thought, see, for example, JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11-12 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859), it
seems odd for the Court to embrace an extra-constitutional principle over an express provision
of the Constitution. 
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[T]he Court was aided, and obviously made use of a major
amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the
American Bar Association, among whose members were Zecha-
riah Chafee and Grenville Clark. The brief said in part: “There
are many different kinds of benefits to be derived from parks,
and one of the most important is the constitutional right of
assembly therein. The parks are held by the city subject to this
right.”62
Kalven lamented that Hague’s framework was “not enshrined as the
starting point for judicial analysis in cases of speech in public
places.”63 He hinted at “subtle but definite transformations” in sub-
sequent decisions and worried about “[t]he Court’s neat dichotomy
of ‘speech pure’ and ‘speech plus.’”64 That distinction protected
expression that was reducible to verbal or written speech but disfav-
ored “parades, pickets, and protests” that were deemed to be “speech
plus.”65 Kalven took particular aim at two of the Court’s recent
decisions pertaining to civil rights protests in public places, noting
that the opinions “bristled with cautions and with a lack of sympa-
thy for such forms of protest.”66 And in a line that would itself
become famous, he insisted: 
[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other
public places are an important facility for public discussion and
political process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen
can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such
facilities are made available is an index of freedom.67
Kalven’s commentary on the public forum laid the groundwork for
a renewed doctrinal focus by the Supreme Court.68 He clearly envis-
62. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 14 (footnotes omitted). 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 14, 23. 
65. Id. at 22. 
66. Id. at 8 (referring to Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); and Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)). 
67. Id. at 11-12. Robert Post suggests that “[t]he phrase ‘public forum’ is traditionally at-
tributed to Harry Kalven’s classic 1965 article.” Post, Between Governance, supra note 11, at
1718.
68. See Post, Between Governance, supra note 11, at 1714-15 (describing rise of the
doctrinal framework surrounding the public forum).
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ioned a minimalist approach to government regulation of the public
forum, focusing on the need for “some commitment to order and
etiquette.”69 As Kalven concluded his article: “Among the many hall-
marks of an open society, surely one must be that not every group
of people on the streets is ‘a mob.’”70
The Court lost sight of Kalven’s warnings as it moved forward
with a speech-based focus for public forum analysis. It focused
instead on time, place, and manner restrictions in a line of cases
culminating in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n.71 That framework transformed Kalven’s minimalist approach
(which would have been highly protective of civil liberties) to a
presumption that a government regulation was legitimate as long
as it satisfied a formalistic threshold of “content neutrality.”
A law that lacks content neutrality because it expressly targets
a particular viewpoint or form of expression will likely violate any
number of constitutional principles, including equal protection.72
Those are the easy cases. And notwithstanding the city council of
Hialeah, Florida, they are few and far between.73 The harder cases
are laws that satisfy all of the threshold inquiries: they are content-
neutral; they do not target a particular class or viewpoint; they are,
to paraphrase a famous free exercise decision, neutral laws of
general applicability.74 The speech-based public forum framework
will not adequately protect against these laws. It elevates form over
substance and establishes what Justice Kennedy has decried as a
69. Kalven, Jr., supra note 62, at 23. Endorsing one particularly narrowly drawn ordin-
ance, he wrote: “All that the ordinance required was that the parade not be, in [Alexander]
Meiklejohn’s phrase, ‘out of order.’” Id. at 26. 
70. Id. at 32. 
71. 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
72. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (noting that “the equal
protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with First Amendment interests” and
concluding that “[t]he central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter”). Kenneth Karst observed that Mosley
marked the Supreme Court’s first acknowledgment that a content-based regulation violated
“the principle of equal liberty of expression ... inherent in the first amendment.” Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26
(1975). Karst suggests that “[t]he absence of a clear articulation of the principle of equal
liberty of expression in Supreme Court decisions before Mosley may be attributable to a belief
that the principle is so obviously central among first amendment values that it requires no
explanation.” Id. at 29.
73. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1993). 
74. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
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“jurisprudence of categories.”75 As Robert Post has argued, “Perry
imposes no first amendment constraints whatever on the govern-
ment’s ability to build discriminatory criteria into the very defini-
tion or purpose of the limited public forum.”76
The speech-based focus of the Perry doctrine is evident in the
Court’s 1988 opinion in Boos v. Barry.77 The case involved a chal-
lenge to a District of Columbia law that prohibited, among other
things, congregating “within 500 feet of any building or premises
within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign
government or its representative or representatives as an embassy,
legation, consulate, or for other official purposes.”78 The petitioners
challenged the “deprivation of First Amendment speech and assem-
bly rights” and argued that “[t]he right to congregate is a component
part of the ‘right of the people peaceably to assemble’ guaranteed by
the First Amendment.”79 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court
cited Perry three times and resolved the case under a free speech
analysis without mentioning the right of assembly.80
Meanwhile, the Court expanded the notion of the public forum to
less traditional settings. In 1972, it noted in Healy v. James that the
generally available facilities of public educational institutions were
public forums, and stressed that “[t]he college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”81 The
75. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693-94 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories
rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one
which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.”). 
76. Post, Between Governance, supra note 11, at 1753. Post argues that “as a practical
matter the government remains as free to limit public access to a limited public forum as to
a nonpublic forum.” Id. 
77. 485 U.S. 312, 312-13 (1988). 
78. Id. at 316. 
79. Brief for Petitioners, Boos, 485 U.S. 312 (No. 86-803), 1987 WL 881333, at *36, *42.
80. Boos, 485 U.S. at 312-13, 317, 321, 324. 
81. 408 U.S. 169, 180-82 (1972). The Court elaborated: 
If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the means of commun-
icating with these students. Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate
in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated
purposes, is limited by the denial of access to the customary media for
communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students.
Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
Id.
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Court reinforced these ideas in its 1995 decision in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.82 Citing Perry, the
Court noted that although the Student Activities Fund was “a forum
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense ... the
same [public forum] principles are applicable.”83 Both Healy and
Rosenberger followed Perry in anchoring their doctrinal framework
solely in free speech principles.84 The public forum, in its physical
and nonphysical versions, had all but forgotten its assembly roots.85
C. The Right of Association
As the theoretical framing of the public forum shifted from
assembly to speech, a parallel development emerged in the displace-
ment of the assembly right by the judicially recognized right of
association. I have elsewhere argued at length about the problems
with the theory and doctrine underlying the right of association and
its component parts of intimacy and expressiveness.86 Among other
things, the shift to association obscures important values and
historical connections related to the right of assembly.87 But the
shift to association has even starker consequences in the context of
the public forum.
These consequences became clear in the Court’s 2010 decision in
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
82. 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 (1995).
83. Id. at 830; cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
802-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Minds are not
changed in streets and parks as they once were.”). 
84. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819-20; Healy, 408 U.S. at 169-70.
85. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, Justice Kennedy
provided one of the rare links to assembly in his concurrence, which was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter. 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
Court’s approach is contrary to the underlying purposes of the public forum doctrine. The
liberties protected by our doctrine derive from the Assembly, as well as the Speech and Press
Clauses of the First Amendment, and are essential to a functioning democracy.” (citing
Kalven, supra note 62, at 14, 19)). 
86. See generally INAZU, supra note 21. The Court recognized the categories of intimate
and expressive association in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). The con-
straints of intimate and expressive association effectively remove constitutional protections
for “pre-expressive” and “pre-political” groups in civil society that would fail to meet the
definitions of intimacy or expressiveness. INAZU, supra note 21, at 4.
87. INAZU, supra note 21, at 4; see also supra Part I.A (describing values and purposes of
assembly right).
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Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez.88 The government action at
issue in Martinez was an “all-comers” policy at Hastings College of
the Law that required any student group to accept any student as
a member.89 Hastings denied official recognition to a student chap-
ter of the Christian Legal Society (CLS) because the group excluded
on the basis of sexual conduct and religious belief in violation of the
school’s policy.90 In addition to withholding modest funding and the
use of its logo, Hastings denied CLS the opportunity to send mass
e-mails to the student body, to participate in the annual student
organizations fair, and to reserve meeting spaces on campus.91 CLS
filed suit in federal district court asserting violations of expressive
association and free speech.92
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion for a five-justice majority collapsed the distinction between
the speech right and the association right: the rights “merged,” with
the clear implication that association added nothing to speech.93
Quoting from CLS’s brief, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “expressive
association in this case is ‘the functional equivalent of speech it-
self’” to set up the idea that expressive association is entitled to no
more constitutional protection than speech.94 But CLS had asserted
that “where one of the central purposes of a noncommercial expres-
sive association is the communication of a moral teaching, its choice
88. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). The discussion in this section draws from Inazu, supra note 20,
at 821-23.
89. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979.
90. Id. at 2980.
91. See id. at 2979.
92. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Kane, No.
C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006). CLS also raised free
exercise and equal protection challenges, but the society’s primary arguments relied on speech
and expressive association. See id. I have elsewhere engaged in an extended critique of the
judicially recognized right of association and its component parts of intimate and expressive
association. INAZU, supra note 21, at 63-149. For purposes of the present argument, I consider
the Martinez Court’s focus on and rejection of the association claim.
93. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985. Professor McConnell recently observed how far the
reasoning in Martinez strays from the First Amendment, writing that “the drafters of the
First Amendment made one thing clear: [Its] freedoms are separate and warrant individual
enumeration and protection. In the past thirty years, without offering any reason and without
considering this history, the Supreme Court has committed the one error the drafters most
clearly tried to prevent.” McConnell, supra note 21, at 40.
94. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
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of who will formulate and articulate that message is treated as the
functional equivalent of speech itself.”95
CLS was not arguing that association is nothing more than
speech, but rather that association is itself a form of expression—
whom it selects as its members and leaders communicates a mes-
sage. Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation obscures the connection
between a group’s message and its composition (think, for example,
of a women’s college, a black fraternity, or a Jewish day school).96 As
importantly, a group’s ability to control its choice of members and
leaders is an indispensable predicate to being able to formulate its
messages and values.97 Moreover, limits on membership and leader-
ship permit a group’s members to develop stronger internal bonds
with one another. The Court’s failure to recognize these implications
ignores the significance of multiple protections in the text of the
First Amendment.98
Having dispensed with the right of association, Justice Ginsburg
proceeded with a speech-based public forum analysis. She concluded
that the all-comers policy was “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
95. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371). 
96. See INAZU, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing expressive dimensions of group composi-
tion). 
97. The inability to see the connections between membership and message formation is
one of the most glaring weaknesses of the Court’s decision in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984). See AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 40 (1995) (“Surely the Jaycees
... will be a different organization. Surely that difference will be felt throughout an intricate
web of relationships and different voices in immeasurable but nonetheless significant ways.”);
George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 55 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1998) (“Brennan’s claim that young women may, after their compulsory admission, contribute
to the allowable purpose of ‘promoting the interests of young men’ is absurd.”).
98. Harkening back to the debate between Congressman Page and Congressman
Sedgwick at the framing of the First Amendment, Professor McConnell observes:
Theodore Sedgwick would be horrified. He thought that freedom of speech was
broad enough to protect the right of groups to organize and meet. It turns out,
though, that according to the Supreme Court, freedom of speech protects only
the message itself and not the process of organizing the message through the
association of like-minded individuals. John Page and the First Congress were
prescient in seeing that separate protection for assembly (as well as religion,
press, and petition) would be necessary to prevent the government from using
various pretexts to suppress assemblies that are contrary to the views of those
in power. In Washington’s day, the unpopular meetings were of the Democratic-
Republican clubs. In Alabama in 1958, they were of the NAACP. In San
Francisco and New York today, the unpopular meetings are of religious citizens.
McConnell, supra note 21, at 44.
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condition on access to the student-organization forum.”99 In fact,
according to Justice Ginsburg, the policy was “textbook viewpoint
neutral” because it applied equally to all groups.100 The minimalist
content-neutrality inquiry under a speech-based analysis was easily
satisfied. But the fundamental purpose of the public forum was
wholly obscured.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF SPEECH
The limitations of a speech-based public forum doctrine do not
make speech the boogeyman. Speech-focused doctrines play a critic-
al role in conserving public forums as spaces for public discussion,
debate, and dissent. One of the most important principles arising
out of these cases is that “the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity” in traditional public forums like streets and
sidewalks.101At the same time, more flexible standards for time,
place, and manner restrictions acknowledge and accommodate
important governmental interests in maintaining order and safety
within the public forum. But the speech-oriented aspects of Perry
and other cases complement the original contours of the public
forum doctrine; they do not replace or obviate them.102 In this Part,
I suggest that contemporary free speech doctrine has muted the sig-
nificance of the public forum in two ways: (1) by relying too much on
the purported neutrality of time, place, and manner restrictions;
and (2) by failing to limit the scope of the government speech
doctrine.
A. The Limits of Time, Place, and Manner
The doctrinal contours of the modern public forum revolve around
what the Court has referred to as content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions.103 The doctrine is far from clear—as Steven
99. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978. 
100. Id. at 2993. 
101. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
102. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“The right of peaceable assembly
is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”). 
103. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression,
whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions.”); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648
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Shiffrin has suggested, “if content neutrality is the First Amend-
ment emperor, the emperor has no clothes.”104 One of the problems
with the content-neutrality inquiry is that it misses the expressive
connection between speech and the time, place, and manner in
which it occurs. Indeed, content-neutral laws can still devastate ex-
pressive content.
Content-neutral time restrictions can sever the link between
message and moment. For example, consider the consequences for
political dissent of a content-neutral time restriction that closed a
public forum on symbolic days of the year like September 11th,
August 6th (the day the United States detonated an atomic bomb on
the city of Hiroshima), or June 28th (the anniversary of the
Stonewall Riots). Content-neutral time restrictions that closed the
public sidewalks outside of prisons on days of executions, outside of
legislative buildings on days of votes, or outside of courthouses on
days that decisions are announced would raise similar concerns.
And yet all of these formally satisfy the content-neutrality inquiry.
Content-neutral place restrictions that preclude access to
symbolic settings can be similarly distorting. As Professor Zick has
noted, “[s]peakers like abortion clinic sidewalk counselors, petition
gatherers, solicitors, and beggars seek the critical expressive bene-
fits of proximity and immediacy that inhere in such places.”105
Instead, “individuals who wish to engage in speech, assembly, and
petition activities are too often displaced by a variety of regulatory
mechanisms, including the construction of ‘speech zones.’”106
Content-neutral manner restrictions can have similar effects by
draining an expressive message of its emotive content or even
eliminating certain classes of people from the forum altogether. A
handbilling requirement can preclude some of the most effective
(1981) (“A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction is that the restriction
‘may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.’” (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980))).
104. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 66 (1999);
cf. Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content-Neutrality Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 653 (2002) (“[T]he courts’
increasing reliance upon the content discrimination doctrine to resolve difficult First
Amendment problems only obscures the crucial issues, and leads to hypertechnical decisions
that are inaccessible to the public.”).
105. ZICK, supra note 12, at 21.
106. Zick, supra note 21, at 396.
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forms of communication by labor protesters or others. And in some
cases, that requirement may even be cost prohibitive.107
The state’s regulation of public spaces through time, place, and
manner restrictions is too easily justified apart from expressive
content. In many cases involving curfews, zones, or buffers, a city
council can come up with some rationale to regulate expressive
activity that is unrelated to expression. But the First Amendment
requires more than just some reason to overcome its presumptive
constraint against government action.108
B. Government Speech
A second challenge to the modern public forum anchored in the
free speech right lies in the undertheorized realm of government
speech. When the government characterizes expression in a physical
or metaphysical forum as its own speech, it can sometimes avoid the
content-neutrality inquiry altogether and thereby impose content or
even viewpoint-based expressive restrictions. Government speech
often unfolds in situations involving government funding of private
107. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 820 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“The average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore likely to be far
higher than the average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted on
public property are doubtless ‘essential to the poorly financed causes of little people,’ and their
prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of communication.” (quoting
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943))). 
108. The Supreme Court has suggested that content-neutral regulations must “leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). But the Court has rarely addressed the meaning of that
requirement. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726-27 (2000) (concluding that the floating
buffer zone left open “ample alternative channels for communication” by abortion protesters).
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Hill critiqued the majority’s application of the requirement,
contending that “[i]t is for the speaker, not the government, to choose the best means of
expressing a message.” Id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (“[T]he government, even with the purest of
motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of speakers and
listeners; free and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the government.”). Lower courts
have held that alternative channels are insufficient “if the speaker is not permitted to reach
the ‘intended audience.’” Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.
1990). The same holds true even when the regulation allows the speaker to reach another
large group. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667,
674 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
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activity, when the government insists that it may limit expressive
uses of its money.109
The intersection of government speech with the public forum
raises unique First Amendment concerns that are not applicable to
all instances of government speech. Consider government speech in
a nonpublic forum. We may have serious concerns over the govern-
ment’s authority to declare a forum to be “nonpublic.”110 But many
if not most of those situations are analytically distinct from circum-
stances in which the government expressly or implicitly recognizes
a forum for the purposes of facilitating a diversity of viewpoints and
ideas.
A more controversial case of government speech is when the
government attaches conditions to its discretionary spending outside
of the public forum.111 The paradigmatic example is the withholding
of governmental grants or contracts to organizations that conduct
abortion referrals or abortion advocacy.112 The Supreme Court has
asserted that the First Amendment does not require the neutral
dispersal of discretionary grants and contracts to these groups.113
The Court has insisted that at some point the coercive power of
109. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]hen
the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is enti-
tled to say what it wishes.”). 
110. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (holding that monu-
ments in city park are government speech); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004) (holding
that a state-run scholarship program is not a public forum); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 790 (1985) (holding that a federal workplace charitable
fundraising campaign is a nonpublic forum); see also Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality
and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 697 (2011) (noting that Summum “blessed a gov-
ernment action that was for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from viewpoint dis-
crimination in a public park—the prototypical example of impermissible speech regulation”).
111. Joseph Blocher’s contribution to this Symposium explores some of the issues raised
in this context. See Joseph Blocher, New Problems for Subsidized Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1083 (2015). 
112. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
113. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
572-73 (1998) (striking down artists’ claims of First Amendment violations when the National
Endowment for the Arts denied them funding). But see Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for
Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2013) (“By demanding that funding recipients
adopt—as their own—the Government’s view on an issue of public concern, the condition by
its very nature affects ‘protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program’
[and is thus unconstitutional].” (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197)).
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discretionary funding is constitutionally impermissible.114 It has
been spectacularly unclear as to where that line should be drawn.115
But whatever doctrinal problems these cases present, they do not
implicate the particular concern of the relationship between gov-
ernment speech and a public forum with a purpose or function to
facilitate a diversity of viewpoints and ideas. And that distinction
might prove constitutionally significant.116 Consider, for example,
why withholding discretionary grants or contracts to an organiza-
tion that engages in abortion counseling does not lead inexorably to
the conclusion that the government could pull the tax-exempt status
of that same organization. In both cases, the government would be
making a spending decision about its money and a normative
judgment about the viewpoint of an organization. But there is a
conceptual difference between conditioning the award of discretion-
ary grants and contracts on the one hand, and precluding access to
a forum whose purpose or function is to facilitate a diversity of view-
points and ideas.117
114. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)
(“[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”
(quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003))); Legal Servs. Corp.
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536-40 (2001) (holding that conditioning funding on an agreement
not to challenge the constitutionality of statutes places unconstitutional conditions on speech).
The Court has also specified that the government may not condition discretionary funding on
loyalty oaths or political affiliation. See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S.
712, 714-15 (1996) (holding that the government may not require recipients of government
contracts to hold certain beliefs); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding that
a state may not withhold property tax exemption from citizens who engage in anti-American
speech); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (“Under the well-settled
doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up
a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for
a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the
benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.” (citations omitted)).
115. Some of the more well-known critiques include Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-8 (1988); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428-41 (1989).
116. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 39-40 (2000) (“[L]et us consider the government’s power to tax and spend. In this situation,
the great dangers arise from the government’s discretion to engage in selective subsidy: the
power to create incentives for individuals to alter their conduct by providing financial support
to one choice and not to a substitute. If this discretionary power is the danger, it makes sense
to distinguish between two types of governmental spending programs: discretionary grants,
and grants made pursuant to neutral, objective formulas.”).
117. Not everyone shares these intuitions. For example, Justice Scalia has asserted that
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These insights are best illustrated by Rosenberger.118 In that case,
the University of Virginia provided funding for student-run publi-
cations but withheld funds to a particular publication on the basis
that it “primarily promote[d] or manifeste[d] a particular belie[f] in
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”119 The Supreme Court
rejected this viewpoint discrimination on the basis that the purpose
of the university’s funding scheme was “to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers.”120
These principles are in some ways contingent on the nature of the
forum. The government could, in some circumstances, close the
forum altogether. In the context of the charitable tax deduction, it
could eliminate the benefit altogether, and then reallocate the
money saved to discretionary grants and contracts for groups that
endorse its normative commitments. That fiscal maneuvering might
allow the government to realize the full potential of the government
speech doctrine in the context of its spending decisions.121 But such
a drastic reordering of government funding of civil society would
likely encounter fierce resistance in the political process. And the
political costs of eliminating that public forum suggest one reason
that the theory underlying the public forum retains intuitive appeal:
most of us do not want the government to have complete discretion
in all of its spending decisions, and we think that the benefits of tax
deductions are worth the costs.
A robust First Amendment would minimize the government’s
ability to proclaim its own orthodoxy. But at the very least, we
might expect the government to be explicit when it engineers social
tax exemption is a subsidy that should not be subject to strict scrutiny First Amendment
review. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia elaborated: “The reason that denial of participation in a tax
exemption or other subsidy scheme does not necessarily ‘infringe’ a fundamental right is
that—unlike direct restriction or prohibition—such a denial does not, as a general rule, have
any significant coercive effect.” Id. at 237. But Justice Scalia’s characterization of a tax
exemption as a subsidy gets us only to the broad recognition that the government’s money is
implicated when the government elects not to collect a tax or fee. It tells us nothing about
whether the denial of those benefits undermines core First Amendment concerns.
118. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
119. Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 834. 
121. Of course, we might also have other independent First Amendment concerns over the
government’s speech limitations. See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 11, at 164 (discus-
sing unconstitutional conditions).
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policy around its own normative commitments. Robert Cover had it
right: the government should fully own its normative commitments,
particularly when the consequences of doing so are marginalizing or
even eradicating dissenting views.122 Justice Ginsburg’s Martinez
opinion falls short on exactly this point. She noted approvingly that
Hastings’ all-comers policy “encourages tolerance, cooperation, and
learning among students”123 and “conveys the Law School’s decision
‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of
which the people of California disapprove.’”124 These normative
assertions sound like Justice Ginsburg is attempting to justify
Hastings’ policy under a government speech rationale. But they are
not “textbook viewpoint neutral.”125 And they are deeply at odds
with “Hastings’ proclaimed policy of fostering a diversity of view-
points among registered student groups.”126
III. RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC FORUM
The current dimensions of the public forum doctrine, in both its
traditional and limited forms, would be unrecognizable to those who
envisioned a robust public square for citizens to voice and symbolize
their genuine differences and exercise their role in a government of
the people. They would be unrecognizable to the author of the Hague
opinion, and they would be unrecognizable to Harry Kalven. Restor-
ing a richer vision of the public forum poses a difficult, but not
impossible, task. In this last Part, I offer four suggestions that
might guide our efforts toward that goal. First, we can identify prac-
tical and administrable limits to the public forum. Second, within
those limits, we should tolerate a great deal of discomfort, uneasi-
ness, and instability. Third, we should include assembly-based
122. See generally Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1983).
123. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010).
124. Id. (quoting Brief of Hastings College of Law Respondents at 35, Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971 (No. 08-1371)).
125. Id. at 2993. 
126. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 3013 (“The RSO forum ‘seeks to
promote a diversity of viewpoints among registered student organizations, including
viewpoints on religion and human sexuality.’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 216, Martinez, 130
S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 372139)).
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values in public forum analysis. Finally, we ought to embrace a
diverse plurality of groups in the public forums that purport to facil-
itate a diverse plurality of ideas.
A. The Necessary Limits of the Public Forum
The state is not without any recourse for regulating the public
forum. For example, the Assembly Clause from which the public
forum is derived protects only peaceable assembly.127 Long-standing
First Amendment doctrine allows the state to regulate speech and
expression that cross the threshold of violence, but the state bears
a high burden of drawing the constitutionally appropriate line. The
Supreme Court emphasized this burden in its seminal decision
Brandenburg v. Ohio, announcing a standard as applicable to
assembly as it is to speech: “Statutes affecting the right of assembly,
like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the estab-
lished distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to
imminent lawless action.”128 The precise line drawing is not self-
evident, but it is workable in assembly as it is in speech.129
127. For discussions about the peaceability requirement, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty’s
Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels? The Limits of the Right of Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
1381, 1388-99 (2012) [hereinafter Bhagwat, Refuge of Scoundrels]; Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581 (2014) [hereinafter Bhagwat, Terrorism and
Associations]; John D. Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1435, 1438-40
(2012); Zick, supra note 21, at 385-89.
128. 395 U.S. 444, 449 n.4 (1969); cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937)
(“These rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to
violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that
abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing
with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed.”). 
129. Professor Bhagwat observes that the Supreme Court has held that “membership in
an organization with violent goals may be punished, consistent with the First Amendment,
so long as the prosecuted individual’s membership is ‘active and purposive membership, pur-
posive that is as to the organization’s criminal ends.’” Bhagwat, Terrorism and Associations,
supra note 127, at 624 (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)). Although
acknowledging that Brandenburg “suggested in a footnote that prosecution for assembly must
satisfy the same requirements as prosecution for speech,” Bhagwat notes that the Court cited
Scales approvingly in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010),
“without any hint that it was inconsistent with Brandenburg.” Bhagwat, Terrorism and
Associations, supra note 127, at 624 n.266. I have argued elsewhere that “[i]n the context of
Professor Bhagwat’s concern about violent assemblies, there may well be differences between
groups and individuals.” Inazu, supra note 127, at 1440. But I also suggested that “these
differences [might not] doom a Brandenburg-like standard for assembly.” Id. On my account: 
Conspiracy law aims at an agreement to commit an illegal act, and it is gener-
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Limitations on the public forum might also be permissible when
the restrictions are responsive to exigent circumstances or narrowly
tailored to ensure access to public spaces. A municipality might, for
example, limit protests on public streets on mornings when street
cleaning occurs. Firefighters could disperse even a peaceful assem-
bly if necessary to reach a burning building, and as stated in Cox v.
Louisiana:
Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to
keep their streets open and available for movement. A group of
demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a
street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no
one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations.130
B. The Risk of Instability
The limits outlined in the preceding Section are minimal limits.131
They tolerate a substantial amount of risk to the democratic project
for the sake of the democratic project. We may rightly worry at the
margins when speech or assembly risks too much violence or threat-
ens to undermine democratic theory.132 But our tolerance for poten-
tially disruptive or harmful expression in the public forum ought to
be exceedingly high. Even injuries to dignity and self-respect seldom
trump the First Amendment. As the Court recently observed in
ally the agreement itself (and some overt act) that triggers liability, not the im-
minence of the target offense. This focus leaves criminal conspiracy outside of
Brandenburg even under a free speech analysis. Assemblies that are not crimin-
al conspiracies may thus still be governable under a Brandenburg-like standard.
Id. My sense is that Professor Bhagwat and I may be gesturing toward a similar conclusion
insofar as conspiracy, like assembly, usually involves more than one individual. (I leave to one
side jurisdictions that recognize unilateral conspiracy liability). 
130. 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965). 
131. Cf. Post, Between Governance, supra note 11, at 1730 (suggesting that the proper
starting point is that “the right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted
only for weighty reasons” (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972))).
Post suggests that the Grayned framework “invites courts to focus precisely on the relation-
ship between speech and the reasons for its regulation.” Id. at 1766. The “crucial question”
is “whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time.” Id. at 1730 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116). 
132. On the latter point, see, for example, OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 16
(1996) (expressing concern for private expression that would “make it impossible for ...
disadvantaged groups even to participate in the discussion”).
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Snyder v. Phelps (a case involving assembly as much as speech),
“[a]s a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public
debate.”133 Snyder’s words reflect long-standing First Amendment
principles:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices
and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea.134
These commitments are not cost free, but they are costs that we
as a nation committed to long ago. And they are costs and commit-
ments that become more understandable when we expand our gaze
beyond speech to assembly.
C. Preserving the Public Forum
I suggested earlier that the principles and values underlying the
right of assembly complement and enhance the speech-based ration-
ales that have come to dominate public forum analysis. Assembly
reminds us that some forms of expression and dissent require more
than the individual, and that the expression of two or more people
can transcend the sum of its parts. Assembly also fosters political
and pre-political participation by citizens who might otherwise be
inhibited from coming together for a shared purpose. And perhaps
most powerfully of all, assembly, unlike speech, shows why political
dissent need not itself be expressive.
133. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
134. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (internal citations omitted); see also Sor-
rell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011) (“Speech remains protected even when
it may ‘stir people to action,’ ‘move them to tears,’ ‘or inflict great pain.’” (quoting Snyder, 131
S. Ct. at 1220)); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding that speech
may not be restricted “because [it] may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience”);
Village of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. 1978) (permitting the
wearing of swastikas in a parade through a village with high concentration of Holocaust
survivors). 
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Consider the implications of these assembly-based values for the
Court’s decision in Frisby v. Schultz.135 The case involved abortion
protesters who sought to enjoin enforcement of a municipal ordin-
ance that prohibited them from picketing in front of a private
residence.136 The protesters had picketed on a public street outside
the residence of a doctor who performed abortions at two local
clinics.137 As the Court noted, “The picketing was generally orderly
and peaceful; the town never had occasion to invoke any of its
various ordinances prohibiting obstruction of the streets, loud and
unnecessary noises, or disorderly conduct.”138
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the protesters
were using a traditional public forum: “Our prior holdings make
clear that a public street does not lose its status as a traditional
public forum simply because it runs through a residential neighbor-
hood.”139 But it then turned to Perry’s speech-based time, place, and
manner restrictions, and concluded that the ordinance left open
ample alternatives for a “general dissemination of a message.”140
Frisby is a hard case and highlights one of the potential limits of
an assembly-based rationale. Perhaps, as the majority argued, the
home occupies such a distinctive place in our constitutional juris-
prudence that the interest in residential privacy trumps other
important First Amendment values.141 But if the Court is going to
reach that conclusion, it ought to do so with a full consideration of
First Amendment values, not just speech-based time, place, and
manner analysis. Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor’s descrip-
tion of the ordinance in Frisby:
The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance gener-
ally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public,
135. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
136. Id. at 476.
137. Id.
138. Id. But see id. at 487 (asserting that “[t]he target of the focused picketing banned by
the Brookfield ordinance ... is figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the home”
(emphasis added)); id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that “the throng repeatedly
trespassed onto the Victorias’ property and at least once blocked the exits to their home”). 
139. Id. at 480 (majority opinion); see also id. at 481 (“No particularized inquiry into the
precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust
and are properly considered traditional public fora.”).
140. Id. at 481-83. 
141. Id. at 483.
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but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an
especially offensive way. Moreover, even if some picketers have
a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless
inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy.142
Justice O’Connor’s characterization assumes that these kinds of
picketers “generally” do not intend to communicate to the general
public and also that communication to the “general public” is
inherently more valuable than communication within a group or the
solidarity that public protest may foster for its own sake. Justice
Brennan’s dissent makes a similar mistake: “Once size, time, vol-
ume, and the like have been controlled to ensure that the picket is
no longer intrusive or coercive, only the speech itself remains.”143
That is not quite right: when the assembly remains, more than “the
speech itself ” remains. The reasoning that Justices O’Connor and
Brennan advance suggests that the First Amendment protections of
public protest hinge on a “communicative purpose.” That is a cir-
cumscribed understanding of the First Amendment that flows from
a narrow focus on speech values to the exclusion of assembly.144
D. The Marketplace of (Good and Bad) Ideas (and Groups)
Finally, we might discover new insights by reconnecting the right
of assembly with nonphysical forums that foster a diversity of pri-
vate viewpoints and ideas. Here, the link to assembly-based values
is less intuitive. After all, what does a nonphysical forum for money
have in common with William Penn’s street protest?
Although the possibility of a nonphysical forum rooted in the
right of assembly may seem counterintuitive, just as “speech,”
142. Id. at 486; see also id. at 487 (“The offensive and disturbing nature of the form of the
communication banned by the Brookfield ordinance ... can scarcely be questioned.”).
143. Id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. The Court’s recent decision in McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014), will
be viewed by some as an important limit on the government’s authority to regulate anti-
abortion expression, as recognized in cases like Frisby, 487 U.S. 484, and Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703 (2000). Indeed, in McCullen, a unanimous Court struck down the Massachusetts law
that restricted the activity of peaceful anti-abortion counselors on public sidewalks outside
of abortion facilities. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541. But as Justice Scalia noted in a sharp
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion obscured the underlying doctrinal flaws
of Hill’s analysis. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia insisted that the Court should have
explicitly overruled Hill. Id. at 2545.
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“press,” and “religion” have evolved to encompass forms of expres-
sion unimaginable to the founders, so too can assembly and its
public forum implications.145 Just as actual speech is not a necessary
condition for the protections of speech, a physical gathering is not
a necessary condition for the protections of assembly. One reason
that we can intuit this result is that the right of assembly operates
even when groups never physically assemble in full: many groups
rarely if ever gather all of their members in one location, but
subsets of members of these groups gather for myriad purposes in
ever-changing compositions. The right of assembly protects the
metaphysical group as well as the physical group.
The second complication of applying assembly-based values to
nonphysical forums is that many of those forums involve dollars
rather than people. The “coming together” facilitated by the incen-
tive structure of a tax deduction does not involve a literal conversa-
tion or exchange of ideas. But here is precisely why the relational
aspects of assembly enrich a purely speech-based understanding of
financial expression. The expressiveness, the politics, and the way
of life reflected in a monetary contribution to a tax-exempt group
are almost always dependent upon people acting in concert with one
another. Most tax-exempt groups are not individual ventures but
are cobbled together and sustained by people who identify with
something larger than their own selves.
Consider the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Bob Jones
University v. United States in light of these observations.146 In 1971,
the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 71-447, which declared that “a
school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students
... does not qualify as an organization exempt from Federal income
tax.”147 Shortly thereafter, the IRS denied an exemption to a number
of racially discriminatory religious schools, including Bob Jones
University in South Carolina and Goldsboro Christian Schools in
North Carolina.148
145. See generally John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2013) (dis-
cussing conceptual framework for the right of assembly in a virtual context). 
146. 461 U.S. 574, 600-05 (1983). The discussion of Bob Jones draws from Inazu, supra note
20, at 811-13. 
147. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
148. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 892-93 (D.S.C. 1978). Both schools
maintained racially discriminatory policies based on their interpretations of the Bible. Id.
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Both schools challenged the application of Revenue Ruling 71-
447, and the case reached the Supreme Court.149 The schools lost
eight to one.150 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the majority lo-
cated the source of the tax exemption in the “public benefit” and
contended that an “institution’s purpose must not be so at odds with
the common community conscience as to undermine any public
benefit that might otherwise be conferred.”151 He concluded that
“racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy.”152
The New York Times ran the headline “Tax-Exempt Hate,
Undone.”153 The Washington Post raved that Bob Jones had been
“trounced” at the Court.154 Despite popular reaction to the decision,
commentators warned that “it is a mistake to think Bob Jones
University an easy case.”155 In fact, Bob Jones University, although
normatively attractive to almost everyone, is conceptually wrong.156
149. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577.
150. Id. at 576.
151. Id. at 592. Burger insisted that “[h]istory buttresses logic to make clear that, to war-
rant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in that
section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest.” Id. at 591-
92.
152. Id. at 595. 
153. Olatunde Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States (1983): Race,
Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES
155 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
154. Id. at 155 n.177. 
155. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones
University v. United States, 1983 S. CT. REV. 1, 2.
156. It is important to emphasize that my critique is conceptual and doctrinal. My argu-
ment is that Bob Jones University cannot be justified on a principled understanding of the
system of tax deductions operative in 1983 and continuing today. It may well be that the
holding of Bob Jones University was a political necessity in 1983. The decision came within
a generation of Brown v. Board of Education, and its holding extended to private secondary
schools (including “segregationist academies”) that resisted racial integration. Cf. Jeff
Spinner-Halev, A Restrained View of Transformation, 39 POL. THEORY 777, 782 (2011) (“The
Bob Jones case was a matter of invidious discrimination because of the time and place in
which it took place.... This case emerges out of the 1960s, with the U.S. Government’s
attempts to outlaw school segregation, and its worries about the common Southern response
of establishing private schools in order to preserve de facto segregation.”). The “political
necessity” argument is an even more compelling rationale for earlier and more substantial
restrictions on nonreligious racially discriminatory private schools that were closer in time
to the initial desegregation effort. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178-79 (1976)
(prohibiting nonreligious racially discriminatory private schools); cf. Douglas Laycock, Tax
Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259, 276 (1982)
(“[W]hen private schools drain off most of the whites in a school system, as has happened in
some cities, they preclude any meaningful public school desegregation. Moreover, they can no
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Setting aside the procedural and separation of powers issues that
complicated the Supreme Court’s resolution of the case, Bob Jones
University is doctrinally mistaken because the government cannot
coherently engage in viewpoint discrimination in a subsidy struc-
ture whose function is broadly pluralistic.157 These pluralistic goals
underlie the reasoning in Rosenberger, and the theoretical frame-
work of that case suggests some tension with Bob Jones Univers-
ity.158 An underlying commitment to pluralism is also illustrated in
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,
which reversed the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status to a feminist
publication.159 The IRS and the district court had both concluded
that the magazine failed to qualify as a tax-exempt educational
organization because of its “political and legislative commentary”
and its “articles, lectures, editorials, etc., promoting lesbianism.”160
Judge Mikva’s reversal rightly rejected “the discriminatory denial
of tax exemptions.”161
Bob Jones University pronounced that racially discriminatory
policies are “contrary to public policy” and placed the school outside
of the “public benefit.”162 To be sure, the charitable deduction (and
the law of charitable trust that preceded it) has always included a
longer be described as enclaves; they have largely replaced the public school system. In that
circumstance, even if they are pervasively religious, they should lose their right to discrimin-
ate against blacks, because they are imposing substantial harm on persons who have made
no effort to affiliate themselves with the church.”). 
157. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-32 (1995); cf.
Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditure?,
112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 382 (1998) (“[F]or First Amendment purposes, there is no workable,
bright-line distinction between tax benefits as a broad category and direct spending programs
defined in similarly generic terms. Rosenberger was decided correctly because the entitlement-
type spending at issue in that case was similar, though not identical, to the classic tax bene-
fits upheld in Walz.”). 
159. 631 F.2d 1030, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 1033. 
161. Id. at 1034. The holding of Big Mama Rag, Inc. rests on the vagueness of the IRS’s
definition of “educational,” but the underlying pluralist implications are also evident in the
opinion. See id. at 1040 (“IRS officials earlier advised appellant’s counsel that an exemption
could be approved only if the organization ‘agree[d] to abstain from advocating that
homosexuality is a mere preference, orientation, or propensity on par with heterosexuality
and which should otherwise be regarded as normal.’”); id. (“Objective standards are especially
essential in cases such as this involving those espousing nonmajoritarian philosophies.”).
162. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595. 
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vague notion of public benefit.163 But that limitation is a long way
from the “common community conscience” asserted in Bob Jones
University.164 Indeed, it is hard to think of how such a standard
might apply in practice. Why, for example, does racial discrimin-
ation in education violate a “common community conscience” but not
gender discrimination, even though the Supreme Court has found
both forms of discrimination to violate the Equal Protection
Clause?165 And if the Internal Revenue Service—a regulatory agency
of unelected government workers—could define this standard once,
what limiting principle prevents it from doing so again? As John
Colombo and Mark Hall have argued, the public-policy constraint on
tax exemption “relegate[s] it to merely another mechanism for the
government to, in effect, make direct spending decisions by selecting
which nonprofit activities confer a sufficient benefit to the commu-
nity to deserve tax relief.”166 Instead, the long-standing charitable
exemption is best justified through a theory of pluralism that allows
donors to determine which charities they will fund.167 Unless we
fundamentally restructure the charitable deduction, we are con-
fronted with something akin to a limited public forum premised on
promoting a wide range of viewpoints and ideas.168
163. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 11, at 69-70.
164. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592. 
165. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (holding that Virginia’s all-male
military academy violated the Equal Protection Clause); see Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure
Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 411, 434-35, 445-46 (1999)
(discussing the constitutional issues surrounding the IRS’s disparate treatment of racially
discriminatory and single-sex colleges); see also Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi
Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a private school’s
Hawaiian-only admissions policy against a § 1981 challenge).
166. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 6, at 155. Justice Powell expressed similar concerns in
his Bob Jones University concurrence. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (“Far from representing an effort to reinforce any perceived ‘common community
conscience,’ the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means
of limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.”). 
167. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 6, at 155. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent emphasized a
separate reason for upholding the tax exemption to Bob Jones: the disjunction between
“charitable” and “educational” in the Internal Revenue Code. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 623
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Justice Rehnquist, because the university clearly
qualified as an “educational” organization, its tax-exempt status should have been upheld
even if it were found to fall outside the definition of “charitable.” Id. 
168. This observation also highlights a problem with the Court’s reasoning about the
limited public forum in Martinez. Justice Ginsburg argued that CLS is “seeking what is
effectively a state subsidy.” Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
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Turning to the assembly right rather than a speech-only analysis
might introduce additional values and ideas for the Court to con-
sider in a case like Bob Jones University, including the way in which
collective voice (financial or otherwise) emerges from individual
contributions to a common enterprise.169 At the very least, the
assembly right suggests that the government ought to tolerate
broadly pluralistic views in government arrangements like the cur-
rent framework of tax deductions for charitable, educational, and
religious organizations.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion may not tell us where or how the precise
line drawing should unfold, but it does suggest a number of cases in
which both the reasoning and the outcome may be wrong. In par-
ticular, greater clarity about the origins and purposes of the public
forum may cast doubt on decisions like Frisby v. Schultz that
restrict individuals and groups from traditional public forums. The
assembly-based analysis also calls into question the reasoning
underlying decisions like Christian Legal Society v. Martinez and
Bob Jones University v. United States, which undercuts the diversity
rationale underlying certain limited public forums. Conversely, the
significance of the public forum suggests that some First Amend-
ment decisions may be even more important than previously recog-
nized. Chief among them are Rosenberger v. Rectors of Virginia and
(a properly understood) Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organi-
zation.
of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010). Even if that were the case (which is
contestable in light of the underlying facts), the “subsidy” in question takes the form of a
generally available resource in a pluralistically oriented limited public forum. Citing Bob
Jones University, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s “decisions have distinguished
between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits” and asserted that
“Hastings, through its [student organizations] program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not
wielding the stick of prohibition.” Id. That distinction has no relevance within the confines
of the kind of forum that Hastings established, which, like the federal tax code, provides
generally available resources to groups representing diverse viewpoints and ideas.
169. The principle may not hold across all of First Amendment jurisprudence—we might,
for example, have a different approach to, or different government interests in, campaign
contributions. Some of these issues are considered in the various opinions in, and commentary
about, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010). 
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In one of the most heralded First Amendment decisions in our
nation’s history, the Supreme Court affirmed that “[w]e apply the
limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intel-
lectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate
the social organization.”170 The Court emphasized that “freedom to
differ is not limited to things that do not matter much” and the test
of freedom is “the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order.”171 The public forum is one of the mechanisms
that we have to ensure this “right to differ.” But its successful exe-
cution places a heavy burden on the state to distinguish between a
“common good” that reinforces government orthodoxy and a
“peaceability” that allows for genuine difference. The right of assem-
bly directs us to the latter. We will need to honor that right in
practice if we are to realize the full vision of the First Amendment’s
public forum. 
170. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
171. Id. at 642. 
       
